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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Larry Dean Corwin appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of DUI and a bench verdict 
enhancing that DUI to felony status. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
Corwin was involved in a high speed accident on 1-84 between Nampa 
and Caldwell. (R., p.5.) He was subsequently charged with operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or an intoxicating substance and 
with a felony enhancement because this was his third DUI offense. (R., pp.8-10; 
pp.32-35.) 
At trial, a witness to the accident, Stephanie Lane, testified she was 
traveling 70 miles per hour in the passing lane of the freeway when she saw a 
white car approaching her traveling at high speeds. (Vol. I, Tr., p.29, Ls.17-24.) 
She testified she observed the driver in her rear view mirror and that the driver of 
the vehicle was a white male. (Vol. I, Tr., p.31, Ls.11-23.) She described his 
face as "wide-eyed, scared look, panic." (Vol. I, Tr., p.32, Ls.11-15.) 
Ms. Lane testified that although she sped up, the white car bumped her 
from behind causing a 'Terking thud." (Vol. I, Tr., p.33, Ls.13-19.) Ms. Lane 
stated that she pulled off the side of the road and that she saw the white car 
"spin very quickly to the left out of control and start flipping in the median divider." 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.33, Ls.13-23.) When the car stopped rolling over it ended up 
upside down in the opposite lane of traffic. (Vol. I, Tr., p.68, Ls.3-7.) 
Julian Aguirre also witnessed the accident and testified at the trial. Mr. 
Aguirre testified that just prior to the accident, Corwin nearly hit him and then cut 
him off. (Vol. I, Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.57, L.12.) Kenneth Seward was also driving 
on 1-84 and also witnessed the accident. Mr. Seward was traveling in the same 
direction as Corwin, Mr. Aguirre, and Ms. Lane. (Vol. I, Tr., p.64, Ls.14-21.) Mr. 
Seward testified that the white car passed him going very fast and that the driver 
of the vehicle was a white male wearing a blue baseball cap. (Vol. I, Tr., p.65, 
L.21 - p.67, L.6; p.77, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Seward also testified that the driver was 
alone in the vehicle. (Vol. I, Tr., p.78, Ls.6-15.) After witnessing the accident, 
Mr. Seward called 911. (Vol. I, Tr., p.78, Ls.1-5.) 
Caldwell Police Officer Anthony Pittz was dispatched to the accident. 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.83, Ls.9-13.) Officer Pittz testified that when he first arrived he 
searched the upside down vehicle to make sure that nobody was trapped inside. 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.85, Ls.5-9.) There was no one in the vehicle, but the officer 
smelled a strong odor of alcohol and observed beer dripping from the floor 
boards. (Vol. I, Tr., p.85, L.5 - p.87, L.18.) The officer also stated that he 
observed beer cans outside the driver's side window. (Vol. I, Tr., p.88, Ls.19- 
22.) 
Idaho State Police Trooper Deshan Cabaong testified that he too 
responded to the scene. Trooper Cabaong testified that he observed a blue 
baseball cap and an empty box of beer outside the wrecked car. (Vol. I, Tr., 
p.157, Ls.2-16; p.161, Ls.3-21.) Officer Pittz ultimately located Corwin, the driver 
of the vehicle, hiding behind a bush in a pasture running along the freeway. (Vol. 
I, Tr., p.89, L.2 - p.90, L.21.) The officer stated that he asked Corwin, who had 
blood smears and stains on his t-shirt, if he had any injuries from the crash, to 
which Corwin replied, "What crash? I don't know what you're talking about." 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.91, L.6 - p.92, L.4.) Officer Pittz testified that Corwin kept repeating 
this line over and over in response to his questions. (Vol. I, Tr., p.91, Ls.20-24; 
p.130, LS.14-20.) 
Officer Pittz testified that Corwin had alcohol on his breath (Vol. I, Tr., 
p.94, Ls.9-18), that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot (Vol. I, Tr., p.95, Ls.12- 
14). and that he was agitated (Voi. I, Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.98, L.5). Trooper 
Caboang testified that Corwin ultimately admitted to him that he had been 
drinking. (Vol. I, Tr., p.165, L.22 - p.166, L.1.) The trooper testified that Corwin 
then admitted to being in the accident, but claimed that he was not driving the 
vehicle. (Vol. I, Tr., p.169, L.24 - p.170, L.3.) Trooper Caboang also stated that 
Corwin had bloodshot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that he had shaky 
hand movements. (Vol. I, Tr., p.166, Ls.11-16.) The trooper also testified that 
he performed a field sobriety test on Corwin, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, 
and that Corwin failed this test. (Vol. I, Tr., p.181, L.4, L.186, L.5.) Officer Pittz 
and Trooper Cabaong both testified that based on the experience and training, 
they believed Corwin was impaired by his consumption of alcohol. (Vol. I ,  Tr., 
p.100, Ls.8-14; p.187, Ls.3-5; p.196, L.15 - p.197, L.3.) 
Trooper Cabaong testified that Corwin was arrested and transported to 
the county jail. (Vol. I, Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.) At the jail, Corwin was given the 
opportunity to take a breathalyzer test. The trooper testified that Corwin, who 
continued to be difficult and combative, refused to take the test. (Vol. I, Tr., 
p.193, L.16 - p.194, L.4.) 
The jury found Corwin guilty of driving under the influence. (R., p.92.) 
Corwin waived his right to jury trial on part ll of the charging document, the felony 
enhancement for the prior convictions. (R., p.98.) The court found Corwin guilty 
of the enhancements (R., p.113), and sentenced Corwin to a unified sentence of 
10 years, with five years fixed (R., pp.113-14). Corwin filed a Rule 35 motion 
that the district court denied. (R., pp.$33-38.) Corwin subsequently filed a timely 
appeal from the district court's judgment and commitment. (R., pp.113-17.) 
ISSUES 
Corwin states the issues on appeal as: 
I Did the State's questions regarding whether law enforcement 
officers believed that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated impermissibly 
invade the province of the jury? 
2. Did the prosecutor's closing remarks at sentencing regarding 
the prosecutor's personal belief in the guilt of the defendant 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct? 
3. Did the district court manifest disregard I.C.R. 32 when it 
sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of the substance 
abuse evaluation that was ordered for purposes of sentencing, 
and further abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Corwin's 
Rule 35 motion that requested such evaluation be actually 
performed? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 I .) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Corwin failed to meet his burden of showing that the law 
enforcement officers' testimony that Corwin was intoxicated 
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury? 
2. The prosecutor, in closing argument and without objection, stated that 
she personally believed Corwin was intoxicated. Has Corwin failed to 
show this one isolated statement was made to inflame the passions of 
jury and was so improper that a timely objection and action by the trial 
court could not have cured any potential prejudice? 
3. Has Corwin shown he is entitled to be resentenced because no 
substance abuse evaluation was attached to the PSI, where the 
evaluation was ordered and where it was Corwin's responsibility to 
provide that evaluation to the court? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Err Or Abuse Its Discretion BV Permittinq The Law 
Enforcement Officers To Offer Their Opinion That Corwin Was Under The 
Influence Of Alcohol 
A. Introduction 
Corwin asserts the district court abused its discretion and violated his due 
process by permitting law enforcement officers to testify "whether Mr. Corwin 
was driving under the influence of alcohol." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
Specifically, Corwin claims error because he asserts this was "the ultimate issue 
for the jury's determination" and that as such, the district court "prejudiced Mr. 
Corwin's right to a jury trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Cowin's claim lacks 
merit. There was no invasion into the province of the jury. Furthermore, to the 
extent that Corwin claims the officers' testimony was not proper expert 
testimony, this argument was not raised below, and, even if it was, is not 
supported by case law. There is nothing that precludes law enforcement officers 
from offering their opinion based on their personal observations of the 
defendant. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such 
as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 
322, 859 P.2d 353, 358 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Doe, 131 ldaho 709, 963 P.2d 
392 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Officer Pittz And Trooper Baaaonn's Opinion That Corwin Was Intoxicated 
Did Not Invade The Province Of The Jun/ And Was Not Reversible Simply 
Because It Embraced An Ultimate Issue 
The "ultimate issue" argument made by Corwin was abolished by ldaho 
Rule of Evidence 704, which allows testimony "in the form of an opinion or 
inference" that "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 
I.R.E. 704. Accordingly, simply because Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong 
testified as to a dispositive issue --whether Corwin was impaired by his admitted 
consumption of alcohol -- is not a basis for claiming error. 
Under Idaho's rules of evidence, the only improper invasion of the 
province of the jury is where one witness passes upon the credibility of other 
witnesses. See State v. Hester, 114 ldaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988); 
State v. Puasley, 128 ldaho 168, 175, 91 1 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Corwin, however, makes no such claim. Here the officer's opinion was based on 
their own personal observations and unrelated to any other fact witness. Indeed, 
nowhere does Corwn assert that law enforcement vouched for the credibility of 
any witness. The claim here is limited to whether the district court erred by 
permitting "law enforcement officers to repeatedly testify, over Mr. Corwin's 
objections, as to the ultimate issue for the jury's determination." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.12.) Consequently, there is no basis for asserting error on the basis of 
the objection Corwin asserted at trial -- that law enforcement's opinion testimony 
invaded the province of the jury. 
D. Corwin Has Failed To Preserve An Ar~ument That The Officer's 
Testimonv Was Improper Expert Witness Testimony 
As set forth above, Corwin objected on the basis that law enforcement's 
opinion invaded the province of the jury. Corwin did not object to Officer Pittz 
and Trooper Cabaong's testimony on the basis that it was improper expert 
witness testimony. Consequently, he has failed to preserve this issue on appeal. 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. 
Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue 
was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 ldaho 457, 459, 
767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at trial on other grounds did not 
preserve issue raised on appeal). The admission of evidence cannot be found to 
be erroneous in the absence of a timely objection clearly "stating the specific 
ground of objection," unless the ground is apparent from the context. I.R.E. 
103(a)(l); State v. Gleason, 130 ldaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 723, 727 (Ct. App. 
1997). Likewise, an objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and 
different basis for excluding evidence. State v. Norton, 134 ldaho 875, 879, 11 
P.3d 494, 498 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Enveart, 123 ldaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 
125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993) (limiting appellate review to scope of objection). 
The transcript shows the specific ground upon which Corwin objected to 
Officer Pittz's testimony: 
Q. Based on your training and experience did you believe Mr. 
Corwin to be under the influence of alcohol? 
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. That's invading the province 
of the jury. 
Phe Court]: Overruled. 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.100, Ls.8-10.) Corwin objected on the same basis with regard to 
Trooper Cabaong's testimony: 
Q. As a result of the observations that you made on scene with 
regards to the odor and the eyes, his performance on the 
field sobriety tests, and his refusal to submit to a breath test, 
what determination did you make with regards to Mr. Corwin 
and his ability to successfully operate a vehicle? 
A. I determined that Mr. ~orw' in was impaired and -- 
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. That's speculation. That's 
invading the province of the jury. 
[The Court]: Overruled. 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.196, Ls.15-25.) Thus, the objection was limited and clearly not 
whether the officer's opinion met the requirements of being expert testimony.' 
Consequently, this issue has not been preserved, and Corwin is barred from 
raising that issue for the first time on appeal. 
1 Corwin cites State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 698, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988), for 
the proposition that regardless of I.R.E. 704, that permits a witness to give 
testimony on an ultimate issue, an expert witness must still meet the 
independent requirements of I.R.E. 702 in order to testify. There is nothing in 
m, however, that supports Corwin's assumption that a "province of the jury" 
argument preserves an I.R.E. 702 argument. In m r ,  the defendant objected 
on the basis that the officer's statements were improper expert witness 
testimony. Id. at 692, 760 P.2d at 31. Here, where no such objection was made, 
an I.R.E. 702 deficiency cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
E. Even If Corwin Preserved His Claim, The Trial Court Properly Exercised 
Its Discretion By Permittina The Officers To Give Their Opinion That 
Corwin Was Intoxicated 
Even if Corwin somehow preserved his claim below, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion by allowing Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong to 
offer their opinion. It is well established that the admission of expert opinion 
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 702 is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Merwin, 131 ldaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 
(1998); State v. Konechny, 134 ldaho 410, 414, 3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Corwin has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
At trial, an officer may give his opinion as to whether a particular suspect 
was intoxicated. In State v. Gleason, 123 ldaho 62, 63-64, 844 P.2d 691, 692- 
93 (1992), officers stopped Gleason whom they suspected of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Id. at 64, 844 P.2d 693. The vehicle had been weaving in 
its lane and when the officer made contact with Gleason the officer noticed 
alcohol on Gleason's breath and that his eyes were watery and bloodshot. Id. 
One officer noticed a plastic cup in vehicle that contained alcohol. Id. The 
officers administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Gleason which he 
failed. Id. The officers concluded that Gleason was intoxicated and arrested 
him. Id. At trial, over Gleason's objection, one of the officers was allowed to 
give his opinion, based on his personal observations of Gleason and based on 
the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, that Gleason was intoxicated. 
Id. Subsequent officers also gave their opinion based on field tests "and their 
-
personal observations of Gleason's erratic driving pattern and uncoordinated 
mannerisms" that Gleason was impaired. a 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit this 
evidence. The court held that the officer "did not venture beyond permissive 
bounds when he testified that, based on Gleason's performance on the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test and other tests, the officer was of the opinion 
that Gleason was intoxicated." Id. at 66, 844 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added). 
The court noted that: 
r h e  officer] did not offer the HGN test results as independent, 
scientifically sound evidence of Gleason's intoxication. Rather, it 
was offered and admitted for the same purpose as other field 
sobriety test evidence -- a physical act on the part of Gleason 
observed by the officer contributing to the cumulative portrait of 
Gleason intimating intoxication in the officer's opinion. 
Id. 
-
In the case at hand, the law enforcement officers' testimony was similarly 
proper. Like the officer in Gleason, the officers here based their opinion a 
number of factors -- Corwin's failed field sobriety test, their personal observations 
of Corwin's bloodshot and glassy eyes, the odor of his breath, his slurred 
speech, his shakiness, his response to questions and apparent lack of memory, 
his erratic driving resulting in the accident, the fact that he admitted that he had 
been drinking, the alcohol found at the scene, and the fact that he was agitated 
and combative. Consequently, like the opinion testimony of the officers in 
Gleason, Trooper Cabaong and Officer Pittz's testimony was well within the 
discretion of the court to admit 
Corwin's cites State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 331, 127 P.3d 231, 234 
(Ct. App. 2005). for the proposition that an officer cannot offer an opinion that a 
defendant is intoxicated. Corwin specifically points out the fact that the court 
made a distinction between testimony regarding symptoms and testimony 
regarding impairment. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Corwin's reliance is misplaced. 
Burrow did not address whether an officer, testifying as an expert can render 
testimony on intoxication, but rather whether "the foundation for the officer's 
testimony was insufficient." fd. at 330, 127 P.3d at 234. Accordingly, the court 
noted that the "type of foundation that will be required for admission of expert 
testimony necessarily turns upon the nature of the evidence offered." fd. 
Consequently, the court distinguished between testimony regarding scientific 
symptoms and more common manifestations of drug use. fd. As such, the court 
reasoned: 
There is a vast difference between the foundation needed to show 
that an expert witness employed an accurate and reliable 
methodology to arrive at a complex scientific, medical or technical 
opinion (such as a psychological opinion as to whether a child has 
been sexually abused, or a scientific opinion about the statistical 
reliability of a DNA match), and the foundation needed for a 
witness to re~or t  his aersonal observations of an individual's 
physical appearance and behavior and compare these with the 
common manifestations of drug use known to the observer through 
his training and experience. Here, the officer did not render an 
opinion that Burrow was under the influence of drugs but, rather, 
that he displayed certain symptoms that are consistent with those 
shown by persons who are under the in.fluence of 
methamphetamine or similar substances. While this distinction may 
be subtle, it is nevertheless real and significant. We ail know, for 
example, that labored breathing and a flushed face are physical 
symptoms consistent with those displayed by someone who has 
just been running hard, although the same symptoms could also be 
the result of an entirely different behavior or condition. No 
description of a "methodology" would be necessary for admission 
of testimonv that a defendant disdaved such svmptoms where the 
. . 
evidence isoffered to raise an inference that the defendant was the 
person who, minutes earlier, had been observed running away from 
a crime scene. Likewise here, the officer merely described his 
personal observations of Burrow's condition and expressed his 
knowledge, based on specific training and experience, that those 
symptoms he observed are consistent with drug-induced 
intoxication. Beyond that, there was no "methodology" employed 
that required foundational explanation or validation. 
Id. at 331, 127 P.3d at 234. Burrow does not support Cowin's argument. If 
-
anything, the analysis in Burrow supports the trial court's exercise of discretion to 
permit the opinion testimony." 
F. The Error Corwin Alleqes. If Error, Is Harmless 
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 directs that "[alny error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." "An 
appellant has the burden to show prejudicial error, and absent such a showing, 
error will be deemed harmless." State v. Rodriquez, 106 ldaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 
1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983) (m State v. Ellis, 99 ldaho 606, 586 P.2d 1050 
(1978)). "The erroneous admission of evidence does not in every case require 
reversal. Such error will be deemed harmless if an appellate court finds, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously 
admitted evidence contributed to the conviction." Id. Alternatively, an error is 
2 Even if the opinion testimony was not properly admitted as "expert witness" 
testimony, the testimony was admissible as lay opinion. See, e.g., State v. 
Cooper, 119 ldaho 654, 657, 809 P.2d 515, 518 (Ct. App. 1991) ("While a 
statement that a driver was intoxicated is in part conclusory, it is the kind of 
shorthand statement of fact that witnesses have always been permitted to testify 
in court.") 
harmless if an appellate court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
jury would have reached the same result absent the error. State v. Sandoval- 
m, 138 ldaho 908, 91 1, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2003); State v. Moore, 131 
ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998); Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 925, 
877 P.2d 365, 369 (1994)); see also State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 363, 972 
P.2d 737,741 (Ct. App. 1998). 
A review of the record establishes that any error Corwin alleges was 
committed by the admission of the law enforcement's opinion was harmless. Cf. 
State v. Lesley, 133 ldaho 23, 27, 981 P.2d 748, 752 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
evidence of Corwin's driving behavior, combined with evidence of the personal 
observations of Corwin by the officers, the physical evidence at the scene, 
including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, coupled with Corwin's admissions 
that he had been drinking, provided an ample evidentiary basis for the verdict. 
Stephanie Lane, Kenneth Seward, and Julian Aguirre gave first hand accounts of 
Corwin's erratic driving that led to the accident. Both Officer Pittz and Trooper 
Cabaong testified that they smelled alcohol on Corwin's breath and in his vehicle. 
Trooper Cabaong testified that Corwin admitted that he had been drinking, that 
his speech was slurred and that he was shaking. Officer Pittz testified that his 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that he kept repeating himself about not 
being in an accident. Both law enforcement officers testified that Corwin was 
agitated and that there was alcohol in Corwin's vehicle. Trooper Cabaong 
further testified that Corwin failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test he 
administered and that he refused the breathalyzer. 
Even if this Court finds that the law enforcement officers' opinion was 
improperly admitted, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There 
is no reasonable possibility that this portion of the officers' testimony might have 
contributed to Corwin's conviction because the evidence was overwhelming. 
The jury would have reached the same result absent the challenged testimony 
because the challenged testimony was only a small part of the entire case 
against Corwin. 
Accordingly, given the weight of the other evidence admitted, there can be 
no reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without 
the admission of the officers' challenged testimony. 
11. 
Corwin's Claimed Instance Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Does Not Rise To The 
Level Of Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Corwin claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when the prosecutor 
stated her personal opinion that Corwin was under the influence of alcohol and 
too impaired to drive. (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Corwin has failed to show error 
let alone fundamental error. Taken in context, the prosecutor's statement was 
not her personal opinion but a summary of Officer Pittz's testimony. Moreover, 
even if the statement was error, Corwin has not shown the error was 
fundamental. Corwin has failed to show that the statement was so egregious 
that any prejudice arising therefrom was not, or could not have been, remedied 
by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the statement should be 
disregarded. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the 
conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 
130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P:2d 127, 140 (1997); see also State v. MacDonald, 
131 ldaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Corwin Has Failed To Establish That The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct: The Prosecutor's Statement Was A Summatv Of Officer 
Pittz's Opinion Not Her Personal Opinion 
Corwin claims the prosecutor, during closing, stated her personal opinion 
that Corwin was under the influence and too impaired to drive a motor vehicle. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Corwin takes this argument out of context. When 
placed in context and given a fair reading, the prosecutor's statements were a 
characterization of Officer Pittz's testimony, not the prosecutor's personal 
opinion, that Corwin was intoxicated and impaired. Accordingly, there was no 
misconduct and no error that merits reversal. 
The prosecutor provided the following argument identifying the opinions 
offered by Officer Pittz and Trooper Cabaong: 
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their 
training, based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether 
or not they believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor 
vehicle. Officer Pittz, who has been an officer years, who is a field 
training officer himself, gave his opinion. Based in my opinion i 
believe Mr. Convin was too -- was under the influence and too 
impaired to drive a motor vehicle. 
And you heard from Trooper Cabaong who is new. . . . Based on 
his experience, based on his training he believed Mr. Corwin was 
under the influence of alcohol and could not safely operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(Vol. I, Tr., p.313, L.16 - p.314, L.lO.) Taken in context, the prosecutor was 
summarizing the testimony of both officers and not offering her personal opinion. 
Indeed, if the punctuation in the transcript was different, if the period after 
"opinion" was a colon, a semi-colon, or a dash, there would not be even the 
potential for this argument. (Vol. I, Tr., p.313, Ls.20-24 (Officer Pittz, who has 
been an officer for years, who is a field training officer himself, gave his opinion[:] 
Based in my opinion, I believe Mr. Corwin was too -- was under the influence and 
too impaired to drive a motor vehicle.") 
Additionally, the structure of the argument shows the prosecutor was 
summarizing the testimony of the two officers. She began her remarks: "You've 
heard from both officers." (Vol. I, Tr., p.313, L.16.) The prosecutor then stated 
that Officer Pittz gave his opinion and then restated that opinion as provided by 
Officer Pittz during trial. Per Corwin's reading, the prosecutor states that Officer 
Pittz had an opinion, then without saying what that opinion is, referenced her 
own person opinion. This is not a fair reading of the transcript. The fair reading 
is that the prosecutor stated that the officer had an opinion and then said what 
that opinion was. This interpretation is also supported by the prosecutor's 
reference to Trooper Cabaong's opinion. In fact, the prosecutor did the same 
thing with Trooper Cabaong's testimony -- she reminded the jury that the trooper 
offered his opinion and then restated that opinion. Accordingly, it would be 
entirely out of context and inconsistent to read the prosecutor's statement as 
anything other than a summary of the officer's opinion. Consequently, Corwin's 
claim that the prosecutor offered her personal opinion is without merit. 
D. Even If The Prosecutor's Statement Could Be Construed As Error, The 
Claimed Error Did Not Rise To The Level Of Fundamental Error 
Even if the record could be reasonably construed as a statement of 
personal opinion, no fundamental error is shown because the comment, in 
context is ambiguous. Appellate review of Corwin's allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct is restricted by Convin's admitted failure to object to this comment at 
the time it was made. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) 
A timely objection enables the trial judge to rule on the alleged error, 
provide a curative admonition to the jury if appropriate, and prevent the 
continuation of the alleged misconduct. State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 13, 909 
P.2d 624,631 (Ct. App. 1995). In the absence of a timely objection to an alleged 
error at trial, the error generally will not be considered on appeal. Id. In a 
criminal case, however, courts "temper the failure to timely preserve an issue by 
the doctrine of fundamental error." Id; see also State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 
571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) ("When there is no contemporaneous objection a 
conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is 
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error.") 
It is well established that "[pJrosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so 
egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments 
should be disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
Here, even if the prosecutor's statement could be reasonably construed 
as a statement of her own personal belief that Corwin was intoxicated, it is a 
misconduct that does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Corwin has not 
shown the prosecuting attorney's "personal opinion" was made to inflame the 
jury or arouse passion or prejudice against Corwin. Nor are the comments "so 
inflammatory that the jurors would have been inferred to determine guilt on 
factors outside the evidence." See State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 48, 175 P.3d 
206, 210 (Ct. App. 2007). Indeed, because it is reasonable in context to 
conclude the prosecutor was stating Officer Pittz's opinion, not her own, an 
objection was required for not other reason than to clarify a potentially confusing 
statement. 
The prosecutor was merely analyzing the evidence and stating the 
conclusions drawn from the evidence. There was nothing in the record to 
suggest this one comment was made to inflame or arouse the passions of the 
jury. Furthermore, this is precisely the type of issue that can be remedied by a 
ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be 
disregarded. This is particularly the case here, where it may not be clear whose 
opinion is being offered. Consequently, regardless of whether there was 
misconduct, it was not misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error 
mandating reversal. 
Ill. 
Corwin's Failure To Provide The Court A Substance Abuse Report Is Not A 
Basis For Resentencing 
Corwin asserts the district court improperly sentenced him and erred in 
denying his Rule 35 motion because "no [substance abuse] evaluation was 
performed" pursuant to ldaho Code s18-8005(9). (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) 
Corwin claims sentencing him without the substance abuse evaluation was a 
"manifest disregard of the requirements of I.C.R. 3 2  and, consequently, the 
case should be remanded so that he can be resentenced. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.24.) Corwin's claim is without merit. As a threshold matter, the court ordered 
the substance abuse evaluation. Additionally, it was Corwin's responsibility to 
get that evaluation and provide it to the court prior to sentencing. 
The record shows the court ordered a substance abuse evaluation: 
THE COURT: Is this also an appropriate case to have an 
alcohol evaluation to be prepared? 
[Prosecutor]: Yea, I believe so. 
THE COURT: I think that would be required. I will order an 
alcohol evaluation to be prepared. 
Mr. Onanubosi [defense counsel], do you 
desire to have your own evaluator? Or use the 
gentleman normally used by Canyon County? 
[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Limus will be fine. 
THE COURT: I will order that to be prepared by Mr. Limus 
(Vol. ll, Tr., p.43, Ls.10-21.) 
ldaho Code 3 18-8005 makes clear that once the substance abuse 
evaluation is ordered, it is the defendant's responsibility to get that evaluation to 
the sentencing court. Section 18-8005(9) further provides that where an 
evaluation is not provided to the court by the defendant, that failure will not 
preclude the defendant from being sentenced, but may be considered an 
aggravating factor at sentencing: 
The person shall request that a copy of the completed evaluation 
be forwarded to the court. The court shall take the evaluation into 
consideration in determining an appropriate sentence. If a copy of 
the completed evaluation has not been provided to the court, the 
court may proceed to sentence the defendant; however, in such 
event, it shall be presumed that alcohol treatment is required 
unless the defendant makes a showing by a preponderance of 
evidence that treatment is not required. If the defendant has not 
made a good faith effort to provide the completed copy of the 
evaluation to the court, the court may consider the failure of the 
defendant to provide the report as an aggravating circumstance in 
determining an appropriate sentence. 
Idaho Code § 18-8005(9). Consequently, it was Corwin's responsibility to 
provide the evaluation to the court. His failure to do so did not preclude him from 
being sentenced and is, therefore, not a basis for claiming error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Corwin's conviction and 
sentence, 
DATED this 2nd day of March 2009. 
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